In this paper we investigate whether coffee farms, who have obtained an in-house socioenvironmental certification by a global buyer, display a better social and environmental conduct as compared to non-certified farms. We perform an econometric analysis using data from an original cross-country survey covering 575 farms in different regions of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and, Mexico. We find that farms who have been granted the in-house certification display a better environmental conduct than non-certified farms, but not a better social conduct. We also find that the positive relationship between in-house certification and environmental conduct is stronger when farms sell to cooperatives, and when they are located in institutionally weak countries. Finally, we find that the institutional strength of farms' home countries positively influences their social conduct. We discuss how our analysis contributes to the literature on the social and environmental impacts of certifications and to scholarship interested in global value chains' social and environmental upgrading.
INTRODUCTION
The production of certified goods has grown dramatically since the 2000s, driven by consumers' concerns with the sustainability of agro-food and other industries' value chains and by global buyers' commitments to source more of their inputs from certified suppliers (Bartley, 2007; Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005; Potts, Lynch, Wilkings, Huppé, Cunningham, & Voora, 2014) .
Certifications come normally with the adoption of voluntary standards and codes of behaviors (Levy, Reinecke, & Manning, 2015) , and provide certified suppliers with both a set of principles that they are expected to live up to and a process for implementing and monitoring those standards (Gilbert, Rasche, & Waddock, 2011) . They have become widespread in industries characterized by the concentration of production in developing countries, such as forestry, coffee, horticulture, and tropical fruit (Muradian & Pelupessy, 2005; Bartley, 2007; Kleeman, Abdulai & Buss, 2014) .
The whole idea behind such certifications is that they can potentially allow farmers and other producers to improve their social and environmental performance and receive higher prices and easier access to markets -thus boosting their economic performance accordingly. This is particularly important when suppliers are small farmers based in developing countries, who, being far from the final consumer, tend to capture only a small share of the value generated in their industry (Valkila, 2009 ). This rationale is grounded on the premise that the final consumer, who is oftentimes based in advanced economies, is willing to pay premium prices for certified products, because certifications provide information about the origin of the product and signal adherence to good practices by suppliers and their buyers (Giovannucci & Ponte, 2005; Valkila, Haparanta, & Niemi, 2010) .
While most earlier studies on certifications' impacts have focused on the experience of the multilateral and NGO-led certifications like those promoted e.g. by Fairtrade, Organic or UTZ (e.g. Taylor, 2005; Neilson, 2008; Raynolds, 2009 ; see also Loconto & Dankers, 2014 for a review), the focus of this research is on the more recent phenomenon of in-house certifications, which are set by private firms, typically large global buyers or multinational corporations (MNCs) orchestrating relevant value chains around different locations (Reinecke, Manning, & Von Hagen, 2012) . In the coffee industry, examples include Starbucks, which developed its C.A.F.E. (Coffee and Farmers Equity Practices Programs) certification program, where farmers are ranked depending on the extent to which they comply with a set of criteria related to four areas of their production process (i.e. product quality, economic accountability, social responsibility and environmental leadership) (Renard, 2010) . Likewise, preoccupied with declining incomes in the areas producing high quality beans, Nespresso (Nestlé Group) developed a sustainability program in 2003 (i.e. the Nespresso AAA Sustainable Quality program) (Nespresso, 2012), while other major global buyers in the coffee industry followed suit to develop their own in-house certification and/or sustainability programs (e.g. Illy and Sara Lee).
Global buyers involved in the production and commercialization of coffee have made strong commitments to increase the share of coffee they source from certified farmers, with Starbucks having recently claimed that 99% of its coffee purchases are from certified farms, most of which have its own in-house certification (Starbucks, 2016) , while 84% of the coffee purchased by Nespresso was estimated in 2013 to come from AAA farms (Panhuysen & Pierrot, 2014) .
These initiatives have become part and parcel of coffee global buyers' social responsibility programs. For instance, Nespresso AAA sustainability program was largely celebrated by Porter & Kramer (2011) , for being a successful example of the Creating Shared Values (CSV) 1 approach, which allegedly helps small farmers in impoverished rural areas of Africa and Latin America to increase their income, reduce environmental impacts and, consequently, create shared value in the community.
Besides being on the rise, in-house certifications/programs may possess characteristics that differ from other kinds of NGO-led certifications, which justify their analysis. As suggested by Giovannucci, Liu & Byers (2008) , in-house certifications/programs have often been seen with some degree of skepticism and have seldom been included in sustainability discussions, because they may be used instrumentally by private firms to satisfy their own ends rather than to truly improve the livelihood conditions of farmers: "they may not meet the economic needs of producers ...by not providing adequate remuneration for sustainable production practices" (p. 44). So far, however, very few authors have investigated their impacts (notable exceptions include Ruben & Fort, 2012; Ruben & Zuniga, 2011; Barham & Weber, 2012) , with some anecdotal evidence emphasizing their meaningfulness for farmers (Porter & Kramer, 2011) .
In this paper we investigate the relationship existing between the adoption of an in-house certification by coffee farms and their social and environmental conduct. By social conduct, we refer to practices that guarantee the safety and health of workers (e.g. use of protection while spraying pesticides or other chemicals) at the farm-level and to practices that demonstrate or enhance the socio-economic rights of workers, farmers and their family members (e.g. salaries not lower than minimum wage; existence of written contracts, right to education of children, child labor policies, among others). By environmental conduct we mean here the set of practices that farms enact to have a better environmental management of their operations, spanning adoption of recycling to a more conscious and reduced use of pesticides.
What prompts us to consider farms' social and environmental conduct rather than more specific economic outcomes (productivity, income, etc.) , is the notion of development as "the removal of various types of unfreedoms" (Sen, 1999: xii) , and the contention that certifications can be an opportunity to improve farmers' (and their families') rights -including right to health, to live a decent life; workers' rights; children or female rights, among others, which appear to us as relevant as income-related improvements. To be sure, the improvement of these rights is a core part of the sustainability programs and certifications, as these schemes demand certain socioenvironmental standards to be met for suppliers to receive certification. In spite of this, compliance with those standards should not be taken for granted after certification has been awarded.
Neo-institutional management scholars have described the (partial or total) lack of compliance to standards by recurring to the notion of organizational decoupling, which refers to the creation and maintenance of gaps between formal policies and actual organizational practices (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Marquis & Qian, 2013) . The relevance of this notion for understanding the impact of certifications is that decoupling "enables organizations to maintain standardized, legitimating, formal structures while their activities vary in response to practical considerations." (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 357) We bring this notion to the context of coffee farming, where certifications allow farms to be seen as legitimate economic actors vis a vis their commercial partners (e.g. global buyers or other intermediaries) because they formally commit to the adoption of socio-environmental standards. 2 However, as suggested by some of the earlier research, farmers may experience difficulties in fully complying with the standards requested by their certification 2 We maintain here that decoupling can be observed also in smaller farms and very simple organizations employing just a few employees -even when these employees are family members. We thank an anonymous reviewer for challenging us with the applicability of the notion of decoupling in the context of small farmers that often employ family work: why would they not be willing to improve the social conditions of their family members or their right to work in a more environmentally safe place? While intuitively correct, we recur here to the economics literature on the value of life and health, which suggests that people attribute growing value to life and health as their income increases (see among others works by Deaton, 2003; Murphy & Topel, 2006; Hall & Jones, 2007) . In very simple terms, this literature suggests that poor people are keener than rich people to sacrifice some of their health rights for some immediate economic returns. On these grounds, we believe that it is plausible that farmers will be keen to privilege immediate economic returns over the enhancement of the socio-environmental conditions of their family members and/or workers. This does not mean that they intentionally do harm to their family members to save money and maximize their economic returns, but it may provide some incentives for delaying or not implementing certain practices that could potentially generate positive social and environmental impacts. These insights suggest that the notion of decoupling can be usefully applied to the context of small scale farms. (Loconto & Dankers, 2014 There may be different motivations for decoupling standards from practice: some diverging practices may be in good faith and be guided by local specificities that do not allow for the full implementation of the standards' provisions (e.g. cultural resistance to some practices) (De Neve, 2009 ). In other cases, firms may exploit information asymmetries and imperfect monitoring to reduce production costs -for instance by avoiding the implementation of costly environmental practices, or of enhanced protection of female workers during pregnancy (Blowfield & Dolan, 2008) .
Drawing on these considerations, we investigate, first, whether certified farms display a better social and environmental conduct than non-certified ones. The underlying contention is that the practice of decoupling will nullify the social and environmental impacts of the in-house certification and the difference between certified and non-certified farms. Second, we dig further into the moderators of these relationships. We focus on three factors that we consider to either exert some pressure on certified farmers' willingness to comply with the standards provisions, or to enable certified farmers' compliance. First, we consider the type of local buyers/MNCs that intermediate the relationship between farmers and coffee global buyers, and we distinguish between cooperatives and other private intermediaries (including traders, local roasters, exporters, etc.) Next, we consider the role of the farmers' home country institutional strength as an enabler of farmers' compliance, and finally we focus on farmers' economic status on the grounds that wealthier farmers will be more at ease with investing resources and time on complying with standards.
To explore the proposed issues we conduct several econometric analyses (generalized linear regression, simultaneous equations system, outlier trimming robust regression, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and quantile regression) using an original cross-country survey covering 575 certified and non-certified farmers in different regions of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and, Mexico. Our results show that stronger home country institutions -in terms of the quality of the civil and public services, the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations, and to ensure the rule of law -appear a fundamental ingredient for the promotion of a more socially sustainable production, irrespective of whether farmers are certified or not. Instead, certified farmers show a better environmental conduct vis a vis non-certified ones, and this positive relation is stronger when they sell most of their produce to cooperatives, and when they belong to institutionally weaker countries. Farmers' economic status does not appear to moderate the proposed relationships in any way.
The paper is structured as follows: First, we review the literature on the effects of certifications in the context of agro producers located in developing countries (Section 2), and develop the theoretical framework in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe the data and methods of this study, while we present our results in Section 5 and conclude by discussing their implications in Section 6.
SOCIO-ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF CERTIFICATIONS: REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
A wealth of academic research has been produced on the effects of certifications on yields, crop quality, farm gate prices, household living standards, and other economic measures (among many others, see e.g. Barham & Weber, 2012; Bolwig et al., 2009; Chiputwa et al., 2015; Kleeman et al., 2014; Ruben & Zuniga, 2011; Vellema et al., 2015; see also Loconto & Dankers, 2014 evidence on the impact of in-house certifications on farmers' environmental and social conduct.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Farmers' in-house certification and their socio-environmental conduct: Decoupling standards from practice
Farmers who have obtained an in-house socio-environmental certification may choose to conduct their business in two ways. On the one hand, they may substantively put in practice all the social and environmental principles that are inherent in the certification. This means that they will adopt practices that will contribute to improve the environmental management of the farm, as well as promote good social practices in favor of their employees and other relevant constituencies (e.g.
communities working nearby the farm). In this case, therefore, the farmers will be compliant with the standards associated to their certifications, and in so doing their social and environmental conduct would result better than that of similar non-certified farmers. On the other hand, farmers may decouple standard from practice and opt for a symbolic adoption of certifications that allows them to enter the coffee value chain and become legitimized as high quality and sustainable suppliers, without bearing all the costs of compliance. In this case, therefore, farmers' postcertification conduct would not comply with the standards, either fully or partially (Jamali, LundThomsen, & Khara, 2015; Giuliani, 2016 contexts where the alignment between the formal adoption of standards and the actual conduct may be hard to fully understand, causally attribute and measure. Developing countries pose an additional challenge to this as they may be a context where it is difficult to monitor and fully establish relationships between standards and conducts due to their institutional weakness and other failures, although with differences from country to country. Earlier research conducted in developing countries, but in sectors other than the coffee industry, shows that decoupling is a rather widespread practice (e.g. De Neve, 2009; Mezzadri, 2012; Jamali et al., 2015) , and it is more likely to occur in the absence of rigorous monitoring and support to suppliers (Giuliani, 2016) .
Enacting decoupling strategies may be cost-efficient for producers, as lack of compliance or deviations from standards may translate into lower investments in new or demanding socioenvironmental practices. This problem is compelling in coffee production, where farmers are often not able to market all of their certified crop and end up selling it as non-certified and at a lower price -in spite of the additional costs met to obtain certification (ITC, 2011) . This makes it sometimes hard for smaller farmers to gain from their certification (Beuchelt & Zeller, 2011; Ibanez & Blackman, 2016; Neilson, 2008; Ortiz-Miranda & Moragues-Faus, 2015; Valkila et al., 2010; Vidyarthi, 2015) , which may constitute a motivation to cut their operating costs by way of decoupling.
Monitoring and enforcement of voluntary codes of conduct is also less than perfect in the coffee industry, precisely because suppliers are numerous and geographically dispersed in remote areas, and this can create some leeway for non-compliant behavior (Blackman & Naranjo, 2012) .
Furthermore, although global buyers granting in-house socio-environmental certifications give equal prominence to both social and environmental issues, and set a multiplicity of rules and criteria that should guide the conduct of farmers, these rules may be vaguely defined and farmers may find hard to comply with all of them. This in turn may lead to some deviance, with farmers deciding to selectively pick the areas where they intend or are capable of enacting substantive practices. For instance, they may privilege practices that are more easily manageable and give farmers more immediate and foreseeable economic returns like waste management, over practices that are likely to yield results over the longer period -such as for instance investments in the quality of life of workers and their family.
Based on these considerations, farmers may be more or less inclined to decouple their practice from standard. In the presence of significant decoupling taking place at the farm level, we would not expect substantial differences to emerge in the social and environmental conduct of certified farmers vis a vis non-certified ones. In contrast, in the absence of decoupling (or even if decoupling is minimal), we would expect certified farmers to display a better social and/or environmental conduct than similar non-certified ones. However, the core issue here is not only whether certified farmers display a better social and/or environmental conduct than non-certified
farmers, but what are the factors that makes this more or less likely to occur. We therefore dig into the moderators of these proposed relationships, as discussed below.
Moderating factors
We focus on moderators that should influence farmers' willingness to comply with the standards provisions, or enable their compliance. First, we consider the type of local buyers that intermediate the relationship between farmers and coffee global buyers, where we distinguish between cooperatives and other private intermediaries (including traders, local roasters, exporters, etc.) Next,
we consider the role of the farmers' home country institutional strength as an enabler of farmers'
will be more at ease with investing resources and time on complying with standards.
Type of intermediaries: cooperatives vs. private intermediaries
We examine whether the effect of certifications on farmers' social and environmental conduct is moderated by the type of intermediaries to which farmers sell the majority of their coffee. 3 Focus on intermediaries is justified by the way the coffee value chain is organized: production at the farm level is fragmented, while the commercialization of coffee is highly concentrated. Hence, in order to simplify their purchasing processes, global buyers (such as e.g. Nespresso or Starbucks) tend not to buy coffee directly from the farmers, but from an array of different organizational actors that act as intermediaries in the coffee value chain. The core of our argument is that the organizational differences among different intermediaries may engender different types of pressures on suppliers, or to provide them with different types of support which ultimately shape their decisions or capacity to comply with the standards' provisions, enhancing the social and environment conduct of certified farmers accordingly (Neilson, 2008; Raynolds, 2009) .
To this aim we distinguish cooperatives from private intermediaries. The latter group includes coffee roasting companies and traders/exporters and other residual types of private intermediaries. Coffee roasting companies are among the oldest types of intermediary in the coffee industry and are private businesses that acquire coffee from farmers, select it, process it, and sell it both domestically and in the global market through a variety of channels, such large importers from Europe or the US, which then commercialize it to large roasters, to niche importers that sell the coffee in specialty shops (e.g. organic or ethnic focused retailers), or to agents of large global roasters. Thus, local coffee roasting companies are a key node in the global value chain for coffee (Loconto & Dankers, 2014 We distinguish these private intermediaries from cooperatives, which earlier research has described as being organizationally different from pure private firms, because they are organizations that are voluntarily founded and governed by their members to serve their own social and economic interests (Peterson and Anderson, 1996) . This form of organization is particularly diffused in the agriculture and very common also in coffee producing areas (Wollni & Fischer, 2014; Jena et al., 2015) . While reviewing the vast literature on cooperatives' functioning is well Handschuch, Wollni, & Villalobos, 2013; Shepherd, 2007; Wang & Qin, 2012; Wollni, Lee, & Thies, 2010; Wollni & Zeller, 2007) , one underlying contention of why cooperatives differ from private market intermediaries is that this organizational model is able prompt a set of pro-social behaviors among its members. Earlier research on cooperatives has shown that its members engage in superior forms of coordination that reduce transaction costs, asymmetric information and allow them to achieve economies of scale in the acquisition or use of certain production inputs, as well as to increase their bargaining power vis a vis their buyers (Fischer & Qaim, 2012) . Several studies have shown that cooperatives often help farmers coordinate collective action, for example, by lobbying governments for subsidies on agricultural inputs (Calvo Coin & Wachong Ho, 1998; Wollni & Zeller, 2007) . Cooperatives do also often engage in the provision of selective club goods, such as shared services, training and technical support and knowledge sharing that allows its members to upgrade production standards and products (Arnould et al., 2009; Kurianska, 2015; Ortiz-Miranda & Moragues-Faus, 2015; Perez-Aleman, 2011; Vidyarthi, 2015; Wang & Qin, 2012 
Farmers' home country institutional quality
We have mentioned earlier that decoupling is more likely to occur in opaque institutional fields or contexts, where, among other things, rules and regulations are not perfectly understandable, nor there is a rigorous, predictable and clear cut process of monitoring. We contend here that the institutional quality of farmers' home countries, defined in terms of the quality of the civil and public services, the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations, and to ensure the rule of law (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011) , is an important moderator in the main relationship under interest.
We know from earlier sociological research that institutional pressures present in a given context or country influence the conduct and choices of economic actors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) . These approaches suggest that economic actors adapt to formal and informal rules existing in their own environment (regulations, laws, codes of conduct, etc.) in order to be accepted among their peers and facilitate their business operations in their field. Institutionally strong countries are more likely to exert pressures on economic actors and other constituencies, and to model their choices in ways that align with the country's rules and regulations. Therefore, in such contexts, abidance by the law is more expected than in countries characterized by weaker rule of law. On these grounds we conjecture that certified farmers will be more likely to comply with the socioenvironmental standards' provisions the higher the institutional quality of their home countriesdisplaying a better social and/or environmental conduct than non-certified farmers. Against this background, farmers' income is an important dimension to look at, because poorer farmers may be more inclined to cut costs and seek efficiency gains by decoupling their practice from standards (Baucus & Near, 1991) . For instance, poorer farmers may decide to implement standards that appear to be more likely to deliver an economic return -like better waste management, or reduction in the use of electricity that can lead to lower expenses, while avoid complying with more resource-demanding standards like providing suitable protection for spraying pesticides, or that are less difficult to monitor (e.g. guaranteeing democratic decision making in the farm). In contrast, wealthier farmers, may have enough resources to invest in the implementation of different types of standards. We therefore posit that certified farmers will display a better social and environmental conduct the higher the income they can count on.
Farmers' economic status
DATA
Our analysis is set in the context of coffee farmers located in different regions of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Mexico. We rely on an original survey conducted by one of the co-authors of this paper together with a non-profit third-party organization to assess the impact of the in-house certification of a global buyer in the coffee industry. 4 The program was developed by the global buyer to enhance the productivity of farmers, as well as to promote higher quality coffee produced through socially and environmental sustainable practices. In this respect, the inhouse certification program includes numerous criteria that certified farmers need to meet on social issues, such as workers' health and safety, working conditions, child labor, democratic decision making with the farm, as well as community relations issues, and environmental issues, such as soil conservation, waste management, use of pesticides, among others. As in other certification schemes, certified farmers receive a premium price for the higher quality and sustainable coffee. (1) they must have been in operation for at least three years;
(2) they are independently owned;
(3) their main economic activity is coffee production;
(4) the business is located in one of the regions where the global buyer sources its coffee in Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Mexico.
Farms not meeting these criteria were removed from the list. Following standard practice and precedent, a random sample was selected from the resulting list of coffee farms and selection was stratified based on farm size (small, medium and large Tests were performed to see if there are any systematic statistically significant differences between the respondents and the non-respondents. No statistically significant differences were found at the 0.05 level, or better, between the respondents and non-respondents and the size of the firms, the age of the firms, the altitude where the firms are located, and the region. Accordingly, there is evidence that the representativeness of the final sample for the population of coffee firms, in the countries surveyed, is preserved.
The questionnaire was administered to the farms' owner/founder or general manager (in case it is a different person). The data collection phase lasted two years, between late 2008 and early 2010, while it took another two years to process and codify the data into a dataset for this study. 6 The structured questionnaire was distributed across the five countries studied. All field researchers received three full days of training that focused on a full understanding of the project objectives, the importance of neutrality as data collectors, and the need to show respect for the coffee farmers. Data was collected via face to face interviews by field researchers and by direct inspection to monitor environmental and social practices.
The questionnaire was designed specifically for the context under investigation and tailored to account for the different sizes of the farms, with the majority of our sample being represented by small farms employing up to ten workers (60%), in line with evidence of coffee production elsewhere (e.g. Luna & Wilson, 2015) . Because this is a farm-level survey, it is also important to clarify here that all the farms employ at least one person (both family or contract) beside the owner, 7 which is important to note given that most social provisions are about workers and their families' rights.
The questions were developed to evaluate the impact of certifications on a broad series of farm-level indicators, and were organized into four sections (i.e. general farm-level information, economic data, environmental sustainability and social sustainability). The questions included in the social and environmental sustainability sections were coherent with all key certification standards'
provisions (see next section). In order to ensure that the questionnaire content was valid, it was tested it on 5 academics and 12 coffee farmers, of whom at least 2 were from each of the five countries 6 We acknowledge that the survey was conducted across two consecutive years when price fluctuations may have occurred. However, since farmers located in the same country were surveyed in the same year, the regional dummy variables included in our econometric models capture both the heterogeneity of the geographical characteristic and the unobserved time effects (such as price fluctuations across different regions between 2008 and 2009). 7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for her/his remarks on this point. We clarify here that 70 per cent of the farms employ paid workers (sometimes beyond unpaid work), while the remaining 30 per cent employees unpaid family workers exclusively.
included in the study. The questionnaire was then revised using feedback from academics and coffee farmers. The running order of some questions was altered, and several questions were dropped because the questionnaire was perceived as too long. After the questionnaire was revised it was reshown to 2 of the original coffee farmers and 2 additional new coffee farmers, and no further changes were deemed necessary. None of the farmers consulted in ensuring the validity of the questionnaire are included in the final sample.
Econometric model and descriptive statistics
The baseline specification of our econometric model is the following linear regression is the main independent variable of interest, and it is a dummy, which is equal to 1 if firm i holds the in-house certification (and 0 otherwise).
The matrix X in Eq (1) includes the following set of moderating factors and control variables.
(a) Moderating factors:
-a dummy variable concerning the type of the firm's main intermediary (COOP), which is equal to one if the farmer sells mainly to cooperative organizations and zero if it sells to private intermediaries (i.e. intermediary agents, traders and/or exporters; coffee roasters and other non cooperative organizations);
-an index of institutional quality (GOVERN) of the farmers' home country, computed by averaging three measures of the Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi's (2011) World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, namely: a) government effectiveness, b) regulatory quality and c) rule of law. The effect of the quality of governance was measured using national level statistics given that subnational level data on this dimension were not available. Given the relatively limited variability of the resulting index across the countries under investigation, we codify it as a dummy variable taking the value of 0 for firms located in countries with low institutional quality and 1 for firms located in countries with medium-high institutional quality, using the median of the original index (-0.07) as a threshold value;
-farmers' economic status (INCOME), defined as the total net income (in thousands of US Dollars), which is measured as the farm's net income per hectare multiplied by the number of hectares of the farms' coffee plantation, divided by 1000. -altitude where the firms are located, defined as the (logarithm of the) average height in meters (ALTITUDE), which is a proxy for the coffee beans quality.
-firm's productivity, defined as the (logarithm of the) number of kilograms of yield produced per hectare (YIELD);
Finally, the baseline model includes also a set of regional dummy variables δj (j=1,…,8) and a firm specific, normally distributed error term ui. Note that, to the baseline model presented here, we add a number of robustness checks to control for endogeneity (self-selection bias), measurement errors and non-response bias (see Sections 5.2 to 5.4).
The pair-wise correlation coefficients amongst the full set regressors involved in our models is reported in the correlation matrix in the Appendix (Table A3) Similarly to Arnould et al. (2009) , in our regression analysis we control for many observable characteristics in order to estimate the ceteris paribus effect of certification on a sample of certified and non-certified farmers randomly selected from a lists of farmers located in the areas of interest (thus sharing the same climate, geography, and growing conditions) and satisfying the same set of criteria listed in Section 4.1. In Section 5.4 we will also exploit PSM methods (as suggested in Blackman and Naranjo, 2010) in order to build a more restricted control group of non-certified farmers matching a set of observable characteristics similar to the certified ones.
[ Table 1 about here]
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we report the estimation results of the baseline model (Eq. (1)) when first considering the dummy variable CERTIF as exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term ui of Eq. (1). We then relax and test this assumption by generalizing our econometric model with a system of two equations that takes into account of the potential simultaneity between the farm's level of environmental/social conducts and its decision to apply for certification. We further assess whether the effect of in-house certification on the farm's environmental and social conduct is moderated by the type of the main local buyer, the institutional quality of the farmers' home country and the farmer's economic status. Next, we check the robustness of our main findings by re-computing the dependent variables ENV and SOC with a weighting factor based on the response-rate of each single item, as well as using a measurement model based on latent factors. Finally, we used several econometric methods such as outlier-trimming robust regression, matching estimators and quantile regression to further check the robustness of our results. Tables 2 and 3 report the estimation results, for different specifications of the baseline model (Eq.
Results for the baseline model
(1)), when considering as dependent variable the firm's index of environmental (ENV) and social (SOC) conduct, respectively. Since both these variables are bounded between 0 and 1, we estimate model (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) and maximum-likelihood generalized linear models (GLM) with a logit link function.
The coefficient on the dummy CERTIF is positive and statistically significant for predicting the environmental conduct of the firm ( Table 2 ). The estimated parameter for the GLM model in column (6) is +0.243 (standard error 0.082), which corresponds to an expected increase (average marginal effect) of about 26% of the sample standard deviation of the dependent variable for a certified farm (with respect to a non-certified one). On the other hand, the estimated marginal effect of CERTIF on the social conduct of the firm (Table 3) is very low and never statistically significant.
10
Concerning the type of intermediary, farms that sell mainly to cooperative organizations (COOP) seem to have, on average, a better environmental conduct than farms selling to private intermediaries. In contrast, we do not observe a statistically significant relationship between farm's social conduct and the type of intermediary. The farm's home country institutional quality (GOVERN) positively affects its social conduct, but not significantly its environmental conduct. Finally, the level of farmer's economic status (INCOME) is, ceteris paribus, negatively associated with environmental conduct, which means that poorer farmers declare to enact a better environmental conduct than wealthier farmers, although the statistical significance of the estimated coefficient in the GLM model (Table 2 , column 6) appears to be weak (10% level).
Looking at the control variables, we find the expected positive coefficients for farm's size (SIZE), productivity (YIELD) and altitude (ALTITUDE) for explaining both its environmental and social conduct (Tables 2 and 3 ).
10 Following one reviewer's comment, we performed a split sample analysis on Brazilian farms, since these are larger than farms in other countries (see Table 1 ) and therefore their social conduct is likely to impact on a larger number of people, generating a greater incentive for enacting a good social conduct. Our split sample results, however, do not indicate any impact of certification on social conduct in the context of Brazil, in line with results on other countries.
[ Tables 2 and 3 about here]
Endogeneity checks
The coefficients associated with the independent dummy variable (CERTIF) in Eq. (1), estimated in the previous section, can be affected by endogeneity bias. In fact, the farms' levels of environmental and social conduct and their decision to apply for certification could be simultaneously determined.
This would lead to a potential correlation between CERTIF and the error term ui in Eq. (1), which, in turn, would lead to a bias in the OLS and GLM estimates. In order to check and take into account this issue, which could also be driven by the omission of relevant unobserved variables from Eq. (1), we estimate the following system of two simultaneous equations:
where includes the same set of moderating and control variables defined in the previous subsection, δ includes a set of regional dummy variables, Z is an instrumental variable (CERT_GROWTH, defined below) while u1i and u2i are error terms assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and variance/covariance matrix Σ equal to:
The first equation (Eq. (2a)) has the same specification of Eq. (1) and the certification decision (Eq.
(2b)) is assumed to be the observed binary outcome of an unobservable latent variable (CERTIFi * ) defined according to the following rule: = 1 if * > 0, and = 0 if * ≤ 0. The model is estimated using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method proposed by Maddala (1983) for binary endogenous variables.
The instrumental variable (CERT_GROWTH), which is included in Eq. (2b) but excluded from Eq. (2a) in order to identify the system, is computed as the annual growth rate of the share of farms, located in the same region k (k=1,…,10), holding a certification from a program of the same global buyer. 11 Our assumption, for the identification of the system of Eq. (2a) and (2b), is that the variable CERT_GROWTH has a direct (and expected positive) effect on the decision of farm i to be certified, but no direct effect on its environmental and social conduct, because the latter can be decoupled from the standards associated to the certification soon after the certification has been obtained. [ Figure 1 ] Table 4 reports the FIML estimates of the system of equations when considering, as dependent variable for equation (2a), both the scores of firm's environmental (column (1)) and social (column suggesting that no severe endogeneity bias was present in our previous estimates. This evidence is also supported by the Wald test of independent equations, which indicates that the null hypothesis of no correlation (ρ=0) between the treatment error u2i and the outcome errors u1i terms cannot be rejected. The validity of the instrumental variable CERT_GROWTH is supported by the underidentification, weak-identification, over-identification and orthogonality tests (reported at the bottom of Table 4 ). 12 Furthermore, the estimated parameter of CERT_GROWTH in Eq. (2b) is strongly significant and with the expected positive sign. Looking at the estimation results of Eq. (2b) in columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 , we find that the probability to hold a certification is larger for larger farmers, for farmers having cooperatives as main intermediaries and for farmers located in countries with high institutional quality and in regions with low altitude.
[ Table 5 about here]
Moderating effects of farmers' main intermediaries, home country institutional quality and economic status
The purpose of this section is to assess whether the certification effect on the farmer's social and environmental conducts (as analyzed in the previous sections) is moderated by the type of its main intermediary, the institutional strength of the farmers' home country and the farmer's economic status.
Since in the previous section we did not detect any severe endogeneity issues affecting the OLS/GLM estimates of model (1), we extend it by adding several interaction terms involving the dummy CERTIF multiplied by COOP, GOVERN and INCOME. Tables 5 and 6 report the OLS and GLM estimates when considering each type of moderating factor separately (columns (1)- (3)) and jointly (columns (4) and (5)). Therefore, the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients associated with the dummy variable CERTIF and its interaction terms in columns (1)- (5) change according to reference category represented in each model.
[ Tables 5 and 6 about here]
Provided that in the full GLM model (column (5) in Tables 5 and 6 ) there are multiple and repeated interaction terms that cannot be directly used to check the magnitude and statistical significance of the moderating factors (Tsai and Gill, 2013), we ease the interpretation of the reported estimates by computing the marginal effects and their statistical significance using delta methods (Barthus, 2005) .
The computed marginal effects of the independent and moderating variables are reported in Table 7 (columns (1) and (2)). When considering the firm's environmental conduct (ENV) as dependent variable (column (1)), we still find a positive and significant marginal effect (+0.054) associated with the dummy CERTIF. This effect is stronger when the main intermediary is a cooperative (+0.060, buyer type: COOP) and when the farm is located in a country with low institutional quality (0.100, GOVERN: low= (0)). 13 The variable INCOME does not appear to be a significant moderator for CERTIF, since the estimated effect of certification on the environmental conduct is almost the same for low and high income farmers (+0.054). In contrast, if we consider the firm's social conduct as dependent variable (SOC, column (2)) no significant effect is found with reference to our moderators (type of the main intermediary, home country institutional quality and farmer's economic status).
[ Table 7 about here]
Robustness checks
In this section we check the robustness of our results in several ways. In order to take into account the different response rate across the items used to compute the dependent variables (ENV and SOC),
we re-compute them as weighted averages of the items (instead of the previously used un-weighted averages), by weighting each single item with its response-rate (ENV_WA and SOC_WA). We then re-calculate the main marginal effects of the full GLM using these new dependent variables (columns (1) and (2), Table 8 ) to see if they are still in line with the ones previously reported (in columns (1) 13 These estimated effects of certification are significantly different from the ones estimated when considering the other reference categories (i.e.: intermediary = NON COOP and GOVERN = high(1)).
and (2), Table 7 ). The estimated marginal effects do not change considerably. The dummy CERTIF still has an estimated positive and significant effect (+0.048) on the firm's environmental conduct, which is stronger when the main intermediary is a cooperative (+0.051) and when the farm is located in a country with low institutional quality (+0.069) and has (approximately) the same magnitude when considering low and high income farmers (+0.07 and +0.048, respectively). In addition to the earlier results, we observe here a positive and significant effect of certification on the social conduct, but only for farmers located in high institutional quality countries (+0.014).
In addition, to further check the robustness of our results to different measurements of the dependent variables, we estimate a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) Structural Equation
Model (Jöreskog & Goldberger, 1975) involving two latent constructs for the environmental (ENV_MM) and the social (SOC_MM) conduct of the firm. The measurement parts of these two latent endogenous variables are defined by the following equations:
where Ei (i=1,…,17) and Sj (j=1,…,21) are the set of items listed in Tables A1 and A2 
The marginal effects computed from the estimated structural parameters α, β, , are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 . The magnitude of these marginal effects are different from the ones in columns 1-2 because ENV_MM and SOC_MM are standardized latent variables. 14 However, the statistical significance of the marginal effects is roughly similar across the models, thus supporting the robustness of our results with respect to different measurement (and measurement errors) of the dependent variables.
[ The estimation results are reported in Table 9 . The robust regression and PSM estimates confirm the sign and magnitude of the marginal effects of CERTIF, whereas the results of the quantile regression highlight a stronger and positive estimated effect of CERTIF for the lower quantiles of ENV, i.e. certification improves the environmental practices for the farmers having a "bad" environmental conduct and less for farmers with an already "good" environmental conduct. The results in Table 9 also highlight some small differences in the statistical significance across the different dependent variables adopted. In particular when considering SOC_MM we find now a positive and statistically significant effect of certification on social conduct, although this is still very small in magnitude.
16
14 If we multiply these marginal effects by the sample standard deviations of ENV and SOC we find similar magnitudes. 15 When we estimated the ATT using PSM, none of the non-certified farmers was excluded from the common support. The median absolute bias computed when checking for the balancing properties of the matched units was less than 8%. Therefore, in our sample non-certified farmers reasonably represent an adequate control group for the estimation of the average treatment effect on certified firms. 16 These differences can be explained in the light of the different methodologies used for weighting the set of questionnaire items used to build our composite indicators for the farmers' environmental and social conduct, as explained in this section and in the Appendix.
[ Table 10 about here]
CONCLUSIONS
As large global buyers in the coffee industry have developed their own in-house socio-environmental standards and related certification schemes, questions arise regarding their success in delivering the expected outcomes, particularly in the improvement of farmers' social and environmental conduct.
While most of the earlier research has investigated the impacts of multiparty and NGO-led certifications like Fairtrade, UTZ or Organic (see Blackman & Rivera, 2010 and Loconto & Dankers, 2014 for recent reviews), we focus here in-house certifications on the grounds that private certification schemes are on the rise, and may work differently from other types of certifications.
Our work hinges upon the notion of decoupling, which, borrowing from earlier research (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Bromley & Powell, 2012; Marquis & Qian, 2013) , we define as deviation between the certification standards' provisions and the actual conduct or practice undertaken by farmers after being certified. Decoupling occurs when farmers are not fully compliant with the certification's socio-environmental policies and guidelines and, as a consequence, their social and environmental conduct is not expected to differ significantly from that of similar non-certified farmers. Our focus on social and environmental conduct is justified by evidence documenting farmers' difficulty in obtaining benefits from compliance (Blackman & Rivera, 2012; Loconto & Dankers, 2014) , and by the relatively more limited attention to these impacts vis a vis purely economic impacts (e.g. Chiputwa et al., 2015; Handschuch et al., 2013; Jena et al., 2015; Kleeman et al., 2014; Van Rijsbergen et al., 2016; Utting-Chamorro, 2005) .
To investigate this issue, we rely on original survey data on 575 coffee farmers located in different regions of Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala and, Mexico. We conducted an econometric analysis using different estimators (OLS, GLM, FIML, outlier trimming robust regression, PSM, quantile regression) in a quasi-experimental setting (Blackman & Rivera, 2010) and controlled for self-selection as a robustness check.
Our results are discussed as follows. First, we find that, while in-house certifications may improve the way farmers deal with environmental issues, they are not an easy fix for social issues:
certified farmers do not display a substantially better social conduct than non-certified ones. To interpret this result, we recur to the different incentives and rewards farmers may associate to either conducts: heighted attention to social issues may be perceived as costly to farmers while delivering fashion suppliers do not protect the rights of informal workers, essentially because they cannot afford it. As she puts it: "firms need to have the means to be compliant. If they cannot cover the expenses, they ask themselves why they are doing it. …If they have to choose between survival and exports, they will choose survival, which means that they would delay the social compliance and maybe not export as much as they would, rather than close the factory because they cannot afford the expenses" (Rossi, 2013, quoting an interviewee, p. 231, emphasis added).
In contrast, farmers with in-house certifications are more diligent in terms of their environmental conduct, a result that we interpret in light of the higher efficiency that certain environmentally-friendly practices may bring about. For instance, re-use of sewage water may result in a lower consumption of water, while other measures -such as recycling -can improve the farm's waste management and give tangible direct benefits to the farm. This interpretation is also in line with research about the positive impacts of multilateral/NGO-led certifications on farmers' environmental management (Rueda et al., 2013; Ibanez & Blackman, 2016; Takahashi & Todo, 2013) , and with research conducted in other industries (see e.g. Khattak, Stringer, Benson-Rea, & Haworth, 2015) , suggesting that an incentive for suppliers to maintain good environmental performance is the reduction of operational costs that it produces.
A concurrent explanation to this result is that environmental provisions can be more easily codified into practices and therefore they are more easy to perform and monitor, while social provisions may be more complex to both implement and monitor, and more likely to generate conflicts within the value chain in the post-certification period. It is also possible, moreover, that buyers themselves place different emphasis on social vis a vis environmental issues, and are looser in monitoring the former. Unfortunately, we could not double-check the plausibility of this interpretation with the buyers, but earlier research has shown that this type of selective focus by buyers may indeed take place. For instance, in their work on Indian football manufacturing, Jamali et al. (2015) find that global buyers placed great emphasis on the eradication of child labor in their supply chain, but did not equally paid attention to other major issues such as job discrimination or gender inequality, which guarantee them significant production efficiency gains. Hence, in the context of our research, it is possible that global buyers' major emphasis on environmental, rather than social issues, produces what Jamali et al. (2015) call a 'selective decoupling' strategy, where compliance is expected only on issues that are more salient -either because they are less complex, more cost-effective, easier to monitor or to govern.
A second result of our analysis is related to the role played by cooperatives as intermediary organizations. We find that farmers that sell most of their produce to cooperatives display a better environmental conduct than farmers selling mostly to private intermediaries. Furthermore, when farmers sell to cooperatives, the positive impact of in-house certification on environmental conduct is higher, which means that certified farmers display a better environmental conduct than noncertified ones especially when they sell to cooperatives. None of these results hold for farmer's social conduct: farmers selling to cooperatives do not display a better social conduct, nor we observe a moderating role of cooperatives on the relationship between holding the in-house certification and social conduct. This ambivalent result of cooperatives on the social or environmental practices is noteworthy. On the one hand, it supports earlier research suggesting that cooperatives, through social monitoring or enhanced coordination, can engender processes of upgrading (Arnould et al., 2009; Luna & Wilson, 2015; Perez-Aleman, 2011; Shepherd, 2007; Wang & Qin, 2012; Wollni & Zeller, 2007) which can eventually help farmers to undertake more environmentally sustainable practices. On the other hand, it casts doubts on the effectiveness of these mechanisms improve the coffee farms' social conditions. This latter result is of course not entirely new, as several studies before ours have expressed concerns about cooperatives as an organizational model, pointing at collective action problems and free riding (Sexton, 1986; Staatz, 1987; Pennerstorfer & Weiss, 2012; Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Ortiz-Miranda, & Moragues-Faus, 2015) , and sharing concerns about cooperatives' capacity to deliver the expected benefits to their members and affiliates (Cechin et al., 2013; Mujawamariya et al, 2013; Murekezi et al., 2012; Utting-Chamorro, 2015 We are unable to dig more deeply into the motivations for our result about the failure of farmers that sell to cooperatives to be more socially sustainable, as we lack information on the qualities and characteristics of the cooperatives and their internal functioning. One possibility is, again, that addressing or improving social practices may be particularly complex to accomplish, and cooperatives may not be a strong enough institution to promote this process.
This brings us to the third result of our analysis, which concerns the role of the home country government as enabler through the quality of its institutions (Loconto and Dankers, 2014) .
While, as noted above, cooperatives do not appear to help certified farms to be more socially sustainable, we do observe a direct effect of countries' institutional strength on farmers' social conduct. Possibly, this is due to the fact that institutionally stronger countries are better able to enforce the rule of law and ensure justice on matters that have to do with workers' rights and healthrelated issues, generating a disincentive for decoupling on these matters.
This result juxtaposes with the negative moderation of countries' institutional quality in the relationship between in-house certification and environmental conduct, which means that the effect of being certified is higher when farmers are located in institutionally weak countries. These findings are coherent with the idea that in a weaker institutional context, global buyers provide assistance and support farmers' efforts in improving their social and environmental practices (London & Hart, 2004; London, 2008; Porter & Kramer, 2006; 2011) . Another interpretation is that that weak institutional contexts work as springboards for farmers, who may see private certifications as one of the few opportunities they have to build a better and more sustainable future.
In other words, the standards demanded by global buyers may act as a source of guidance and stimulus that the farmers' country institutional apparatuses are unable to offer. Not surprisingly, moreover, it is farmers with the poorest environmental conduct who benefit more from being certified, while certification does improve less the environmental conduct of farmers with "already good" environmental management standards. This finding is also consistent with the evidence of relatively poorer farmers (i.e. low income) displaying a better environmental conduct. Deprivation, loosely understood as lower income and government weaknesses, seems therefore to be a trigger for enhancing farmers' environmental conduct.
Overall, our work contributes to the literature on the impact of socio-environmental certifications on farmers' social and environmental conduct, with a focus on in-house certifications, which have received less attention from prior research especially if compared to other kinds of certification schemes (Arnould et al., 2009; Ibanez & Blackman, 2016; Renard, 2010; Rueda et al., 2013; Ruben & Zuniga, 2011; Wollni et al., 2010) . We contribute to earlier research by examining some of the factors that may concur to the existence of a positive relationship between socioenvironmental policies and practices, and suggest that key drivers of social conduct may be widely different from drivers of farmers' environmental conduct. In a nutshell, strong home country institutions appear a fundamental ingredient for the promotion of a more socially sustainable production, whereas other types of institutions, like certifications and cooperatives, may serve the purpose of enhancing environmental sustainability in the absence of strong country-level
institutions.
Yet our study limits the observation of socio-environmental impacts to the items and issues that were part of the certification scheme's main objectives or provisions, not on the advancements promoted by the adoption of the in-house certification on the overall enjoyment of local communities' human rights, and on the eradication of different types of unfreedoms (Sen, 1999; Giuliani & Macchi, 2014) . In fact, a large part of contemporary studies on standards and certifications focuses on compliance in these narrow terms, while we concur with the need to study the link between policies and practices and their expected outcome (Bromley and Powell, 2012) , which is that of building a more sustainable and just society. 17 We leave this very important area of research to future endeavors.
Our study does also tangentially contribute to recent research interested in understanding whether suppliers' participation in global value chains (or global production networks) contributes to their social and/or environmental upgrading (e.g. Barrientos, Gereffi & Rossi, 2011; De Marchi, Di Maria & Micelli, 2013; Rossi, 2013; Selwyn, 2013; Poulsen, Ponte & Lister, 2016 This paper has some limitations and the results should be interpreted with some caution. We could only count on cross-sectional data, because of the cost and the difficulty of replicating the survey data collection on the same farmers for several periods. Hence, our analysis is performed in a quasi-experimental setting, by comparing the different environmental and social conduct of certified vs. non-certified firms, conditional on several observable characteristics (ceteris paribus), under the assumption that no other relevant variables or confounding factors have been omitted in our models. Although we checked the robustness of our results (including for self-selection issues) using different measurement methods, econometric tools and model specifications, the causal interpretation of our findings should be taken with some caution, as panel data setting or the random treatment assignment in a randomized control trial have proven to be statistically more robust approaches for impact evaluations. Moreover, our data did not allow us to distinguish between different kinds of cooperatives, and therefore we treated these intermediaries as a unique homogenous bundle, which is probably over simplistic. A more qualitative ethnographic approach to the analysis of the influence of cooperatives and, more broadly, on the processes through which our moderators influence farmers' conduct could be a valuable way forward and complement to this study. Finally, we acknowledge that our measures of environmental and social conduct have been computed using the answers provided by the respondents on a set of questionnaire items during a third-party audit and we may have (inevitably) lost some information when summarizing in one 0-1 score such a complex and multidimensional construct. An interesting research avenue would be to couple these measures with more objective/quantitative indicators based e.g. on the number
